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ABSTRACT 
A growing body of literature documents the important role played by moral outrage or moral 
anger in stakeholders’ reactions to cases of corporate social irresponsibility. Existing research 
focuses more on the consequences of moral outrage than a systematic analysis of how 
appraisals of irresponsible corporate behavior can lead to this emotional experience. In this 
paper we develop and test, in two field studies, an extended model of moral outrage that 
identifies the cognitions that lead to, and are associated with, this emotional experience. This 
research contributes to the existing literature on reactions to corporate social irresponsibility 
by explaining how observers’ evaluation of irresponsible corporate behavior leads to reactions 
of moral anger. The paper also helps clarify the difference between moral outrage and other 
types of anger and offers useful insights for managers that have to confront public outrage 
following cases of irresponsible corporate behavior. Finally, the analysis of the causes of 
stakeholders’ anger at irresponsible corporations opens important avenues for future research 
that are presented in the paper.  
Keywords: corporate social irresponsibility, moral outrage, anger, fairness, justice, revenge. 
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Introduction 
Existing analyses investigating stakeholders’ reactions to irresponsible corporate behavior 
document the important role played by moral outrage (Lindenmeier et al. 2012) or righteous 
anger (Cronin et al. 2012; Grappi et al. 2013b; Romani et al. 2013). This growing body of 
research shows that feelings of moral anger can motivate consumer boycotts (Braunsberger 
and Buckler 2011; Cronin et al. 2012; Friedman 1999), generate negative attitudes towards the 
organization (Grappi et al. 2013a; 2013b) and create negative word-of-mouth (Grappi et al. 
2013b; Lindenmeier et al. 2012).  
Research to date, however, has not examined which appraisals of corporate behavior are more 
likely to cause moral outrage (Ellsworth and Tong, 2006). Consider, for example, the following 
two quotes that are taken from the first study reported in this article. They illustrate the 
reactions of two participants to fraudulent behavior by a pharmaceutical company: 
“This article makes me angry. A company that would put greed over the health of 
underage teenagers should be prosecuted.” 
“I immediately felt angry at GSK for promoting a drug that was not safe for the usage 
that they were claiming. This reckless, irresponsible behavior is why the pharmaceutical 
industry has such a terrible reputation. I also felt concerned for all of the children who 
had been mistakenly prescribed this medication by doctors who were misled by reps from 
GSK.”   
In the first case, feelings of anger appear primarily caused by attributions about the motives of 
unethical corporate behavior. The perception that greed has motivated the fraud seems to drive 
moral outrage. In the second, the emotion appears to be caused much more by a concern for 
the perceived severity of the consequences caused and a sense of injustice.  
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Understanding which appraisals of irresponsible corporate behavior cause feelings of moral 
outrage is important for two reasons. First, it helps managers craft messages that are more 
effective in limiting the damage caused by corporate moral failures thus providing valuable 
insights for crisis communications (Coombs 2007; Coombs and Holladay 2001). Second, from 
a theoretical perspective, a conceptual model of moral outrage helps clarify the unique 
characteristics of this emotion. Although talk of moral outrage is very popular across different 
research disciplines and topics (Salerno and Peter-Hagene 2013; Skitka et al. 2004; Thomas 
and McGarty 2009), scholars question the possibility of distinguishing this emotion from anger 
(Batson 2011; O’Mara et al. 2011). In this paper, we aim to develop a thorough analysis of the 
appraisals that influence moral outrage in order to tease out the distinctive features of this 
emotion (Bagozzi et al. 1999; Roseman et al. 1996).  
In two field studies, we examine a model of moral outrage that extends current research by 
identifying the cognitive antecedents of this emotion. Consistent with appraisal theory, 
understanding the cognitions associated with a discrete emotional experience clarifies the 
meaning that the experience has for consumers and offers insight on the likely behavioral 
reactions caused by the emotion (Bagozzi et al. 1999; Roseman et al. 1994). This paper 
develops our understanding of the causes of moral outrage at socially irresponsible corporate 
behavior and clarifies the circumstances under which observers are likely to experience this 
emotion. Moreover, it offers evidence supporting the need to distinguish feelings of anger and 
moral outrage, at least in the context of reactions to unethical corporate behavior.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. First, we review the relevant research 
background and introduce a new conceptual model of moral outrage. We then present the 
findings of two empirical studies of the model. Finally, we discuss the implications of the 
findings for scholarship and managerial practice. 
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Research background 
The literature suggests that four cognitive appraisals are particularly important in determining 
moral outrage: 1) attributions of blame to the corporation, 2) the perceived greed of the 
corporation, 3) the perceived unfairness of corporate behavior, and 4) the perceived severity of 
the consequences caused by corporate behavior. Before discussing research on each of these 
cognitions, however, we analyse how scholars define moral outrage and examine the 
differences between this emotion and feelings of anger. 
Moral outrage and anger 
While many scholars present evidence in support of the importance of moral outrage in 
reactions to perceived injustices (Darley and Pittman 2003; Laham et al. 2010; Salerno and 
Peter-Hagene 2013; Skitka et al. 2004; Thomas and McGarty 2009; Wakslak et al. 2007), 
others question the relevance and power of this emotion (Batson 2011; O’Mara et al. 2011).  
A disputed issue is the ability of past research to differentiate moral outrage from other types 
of anger such as empathic anger and personal anger (Batson et al. 2007; O’Mara et al. 2011). 
While perceived fairness is an appraisal that influences feelings of anger across different 
research contexts (e.g. Gibson and Callister 2009), moral outrage is determined primarily by 
the perception that a moral principle has been violated (Batson et al. 2009). In theory, this 
emotion should be clearly different from the one experienced when personal goals have been 
hampered (personal anger) or when someone we care about is being affected negatively 
(empathic anger) (Hoffman 1989; 2000; O’Mara et al. 2011;).
Research on reactions to irresponsible corporate behavior has carried forward this definition of 
moral outrage (e.g. Cronin et al. 2012; Grappi et al. 2013a; Romani et al. 2013) without 
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sufficient critical examination of its underlying assumptions. While Lindenmeier and 
colleagues (2012) test the relationship between perceived (un)fairness of corporate behavior 
and feelings of moral outrage empirically, most research merely assumes that unethical 
behavior causes feelings of righteous anger or moral outrage. Considering that in many cases 
of irresponsible corporate behavior observers are not directly affected by the consequences of 
the ethical transgression (e.g. Ohbuchi et al. 2004), this assumption seems justifiable. However, 
the evidence available is mixed and it is not clear exactly what the differences are between 
moral outrage and feelings of anger. There is evidence, for example, that the identity of the 
victims of unethical behavior has an impact on the level of outrage generated (Batson et al. 
2009). Scholars have found that moral outrage is much higher when the victims share the same 
identity of the observer and this would call into question the idea that moral outrage is caused 
simply by the disconfirmation of a moral norm (Lindenmeier et al. 2012).  
These ongoing debates inform this study. Considering the close relationships between anger 
and moral outrage, we use existing literature on the former emotion to develop a model 
comprising the cognitive antecedents of consumer outrage. This literature identifies blame 
(Aquino et al. 2001; Barclay et al. 2005), greed (Grégoire et al. 2010) and severity of the 
violation (Mazzocco et al. 2004; Tripp et al. 2007) as key appraisals associated with anger. To 
test whether outrage is uniquely associated with reactions to moral failures, we test two models. 
One explores feelings of moral outrage as a uniquely moral emotion driven by the perception 
that corporate behavior is unjust. The second model equates moral outrage with feelings of 
anger. In Figure 1 we present these two alternative models and below we discuss the literature 
that supports them. 
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Sensing injustice: perceived unfairness 
Consistent with the characteristics of moral outrage reviewed above, we argue that perceived 
unfairness is the cognitive appraisal associated with this emotion directly. Moreover, we expect 
the impact of all the other cognitions, activated by the appraisal of irresponsible corporate 
behavior, to be mediated by perceived unfairness. 
There is extensive evidence showing how perceptions of (un)fairness are linked to anger. 
Scholars in social-psychology (Carlsmith et al. 2002; Darley and Pittman 2003), organizational 
behavior (Aquino et al. 2001; Folger and Cropanzano 1998; Gibson and Callister 2009; Tripp 
et al. 2007) and marketing (Cronin et al. 2012; Grappi et al. 2013b; Lindenmeier et al. 2012) 
conclude that the perception that an institution or organization is behaving unfairly triggers 
angry reactions. Scholars have also explored the feelings of anger caused by unfair corporate 
behavior within the context of justice theory, differentiating between distributive justice 
(fairness of outcomes) and procedural justice (fairness of process) (Barclay et al. 2005; Mullen 
and Skitka 2006; Murphy and Tyler 2008). In the context of irresponsible corporate behavior, 
research to date has focused exclusively on anger caused by unfair outcomes (Grappi et al. 
2013b; Lindenmeier et al. 2012) although it is reasonable to expect that future research will 
focus also on procedural justice.  
There is, however, research suggesting that justice appraisals are not the most important 
determinants of feelings of moral anger. Research on anger at service failure and/or poor 
service recovery, suggests that beliefs about the fairness of corporate action allow individuals 
to infer the motives for the target company’s behavior (Grégoire and Fisher 2008; Grégoire et 
al. 2010; Joireman et al. 2013). According to this account, which arguably focuses on personal 
anger rather than moral outrage, the appraisal of an injustice influences perceived greed 
(Grégoire et al. 2010), which is considered to be the most direct cause of feelings of anger.  
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Service marketing scholars that study reactions to poor service delivery discuss the importance 
of feelings of rage (Harris 2013; McColl-Kennedy et al. 2009; Surachartkumtonkun et al. 2013) 
and claim that perceived unfairness forms an important dimension of this emotional experience 
(e.g. Surachartkumtonkun et al. 2013). Customer rage is defined as “furious, overwhelming, 
extreme anger” (Surachartkumtonkun et al. 2013, p. 73) and seems to overlap with moral 
outrage.  
Making sense of the motive: perceived greed  
Justice research has established that the motives attributed to the perpetrators are important in 
generating emotional reactions (Crossley 2009; Grégoire et al. 2010) and greed is a well-
documented motivation individuals tend to infer when confronting questionable corporate 
practices (McGovern and Moon 2007). Attributions of greed are also an important component 
in the psychology of hate and, from this point of view, should be key drivers in motivating 
retaliations against irresponsible corporate behavior (Sternberg 2003). Consistent with existing 
research on revenge and justice perceptions (Crossley 2009), perceived greed is defined as the 
judgement that the perpetrator is causing damage to others in order to obtain a personal 
advantage. Greedy behavior is motivated by opportunism and selfishness (see also Grégoire et 
al. 2010). When the offense is only attributed to negligence, the desire for revenge is relatively 
weakened (Darley and Pittman 2003) but the intensity of the reaction is stronger when the 
violation is perceived as deliberate (Averill 1982; Baumeister et al. 1990). It is reasonable to 
expect, therefore, that attributions of greed are likely to influence experiences of moral outrage. 
Somewhat more difficult is to understand exactly how perceived greed exerts its effect on the 
emotional reactions. 
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Existing evidence shows that perceived greed influences feelings of anger directly (Crossley 
2009; Grégoire et al. 2009; Joireman et al. 2013). This is also consistent with attribution theory 
that expects anger to be associated with situations where people have control (or are perceived 
as having control) for what the observer considers negative outcomes (Kelley and Michela 
1980; Weiner 1985; 1993; 2001). However, according to the account of moral outrage proposed 
here, the impact of greed on this emotion should be mediated by justice appraisals. The 
conceptual argument for moral outrage suggests that greed enhances the perceived unfairness 
of a certain behavior and it is this assessment of injustice that ultimately triggers the emotion. 
Both these causal paths are explored in this study to examine the specific appraisal process that 
characterizes outrage at irresponsible corporate behavior.  
Finding the culprit: importance of blame attributions 
Attributions of blame are very important in determining angry reactions. This is consistent with 
attribution theory (Weiner 1993) as well as research in several domains, such as, the 
psychology of justice and revenge (Alicke 2000; Barclay et al. 2005; Darley and Pittman 2003) 
and the study of anger in marketing contexts (Bonifield and Cole 2006; Funches 2011). 
Theoretical accounts differ on whether the influence is direct or mediated by other variables 
and on how blame relates to other appraisal dimensions.  
Work on blame attribution suggests that inferences about perpetrators’ motives reinforce their 
culpability: in certain circumstances perceived greed leads to blame (Averill 1982; Ohbuchi et 
al. 2004). However, when confronting irresponsible corporate behavior, it is reasonable to 
assume that people will start from attributions of culpability and it is blame that, in turn, causes 
attributions of greed (Crossley 2009). Unless individuals hold pre-existing information about 
the motivation of corporate action, blame should inform perceived greed and not the other way 
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around. This is consistent with research on customer revenge showing that, when consumers 
appraise the causes of poor service delivery, attributions of blame precede the perception of 
corporate greed (Grégoire et al. 2010; Joireman et al. 2013). 
It is also possible to expect blame to influence moral outrage at irresponsible corporate 
behavior directly. There is a significant body of research linking blame to feelings of anger. 
Some authors maintain that negative moral emotions, such as moral outrage, mediate the 
relationship between blame and retaliation (Darley and Pittman 2003; Tripp et al. 2007). This 
interpretation, however, seems to contradict the definition of moral outrage presented above 
that describes this emotion as driven by appraisals of fairness primarily. This view leads us to 
hypothesize that the effect of blame on moral outrage is indirect and mediated by its influence 
on greed, which affects perceived fairness. The indirect effect of blame on moral outrage, 
although it has not been directly tested in previous research, appears theoretically consistent 
with some previous accounts of anger that have researched how other cognitions can mediate 
the impact of this variable on emotional reactions (Grégoire et al. 2010; Lange and Washburn 
2012). 
Appraising the damage: perceived severity 
Existing theorizing supports the intuitive observation that perceived severity should influence 
the appraisal of corporate social irresponsibility (Lange and Washburn, 2012). In the 
workplace, as well as in marketplace interactions, scholars have found that the higher the 
severity of the harm, the stronger the emotional reaction and the subsequent motivation to 
retaliate against the firm (Bradfield and Aquino 1999; Grégoire et al. 2010; Miller and Vidmar 
1981; Tripp et al. 2002). It is unclear, however, whether this impact should always be 
transmitted to the emotional reaction directly or whether it is better to conceive it as an indirect 
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effect, at least in the case of moral outrage at corporate transgressions. In previous research on 
anger, the perceived severity of corporate misdemeanours appears to influence the emotional 
reaction directly (Aquino et al. 2001; Barclay et al. 2005; Grégoire et al. 2010). However, 
consistent with the view of moral outrage discussed above, we would expect this effect to be 
mediated by the perceived unfairness of the target behavior. The previous studies that have 
examined the effect of perceived severity on anger have focused on instances of personal 
anger; when the individual is disadvantaged by corporate actions directly. Furthermore, there 
is evidence that supports an alternative, indirect path that explains the effect of perceived 
severity on moral outrage.  
Previous research shows how the perceived severity of an action can affect blame attributions. 
As suggested by Alicke (2000; p. 569) “harmful events, from minor transgressions to 
international disasters, arouse the desire to identify a blameworthy culprit”. We expect this 
process to hold true also when the negative effects of irresponsible corporate behavior are 
appraised. At the same time, that which scholars call “outcome-bias” suggests that culpability 
is influenced by the quality of the outcomes generated (Lowe and Medway 1976; Mazzocco et 
al. 2004) so that questionable practices are more likely to be judged as unethical when they 
generate negative outcomes (Gino et al. 2010). This is also consistent with accounts of 
attribution theory in consumer research (Folkes 1988). 
Scholars have also shown that inferences about motives are automatically activated when a 
negative outcome is contemplated (Reeder et al. 2002; Reeder et al. 2005). Consequently, it is 
reasonable to expect that the higher the harm caused by a corporate transgression, the more 
likely will be the attribution of negative motives such as greed to the company in question. This 
hypothesis is corroborated by research on revenge against poor service delivery (Grégoire et 
al. 2010). 
12 
Consistent with justice theory, we also expect that higher severity will influence appraisals of 
fairness (Barclay et al. 2005; Blader 2007). The link between severity and perceived 
(un)fairness is also supported by work in moral philosophy and moral psychology showing 
how people rely on their evaluations of the outcomes of a certain behavior to assess its ethicality 
(Mudrack and Mason 2012; Vitell 2003). 
Consequences of moral outrage 
Although in this article we focus on the analysis of the antecedents of moral outrage, we also 
assess the influence of this emotion on intentions to spread negative communication on the 
company (i.e. negative word-of-mouth). The importance of moral outrage, in fact, is 
inextricably linked with the ability of this emotion to cause specific behavioral outcomes.  
Existing research on righteous anger has examined a number of potential outcomes of this 
emotion and consistently shown that experiences of outrage lead to potential aggressive 
behaviour against the organization. Scholars, for example, link anger with intentions to boycott 
an organization (Braunsberger and Buckler 2011; Cronin et al. 2012; Friedman 1999; 
Lindenmeier et al. 2012). There is also some evidence showing that feelings of moral outrage 
can cause individuals to spread negative information about a company (Grappi et al. 2013b; 
Lindenmeier et al. 2012). 
Recently Romani and colleagues (2013) have suggested that it is important to differentiate 
between different types of retaliatory reactions against irresponsible corporate behavior. The 
authors maintain that different types of emotional experience lead to different behavioral 
reactions. Specifically, they argue that anger leads to “constructive punitive actions”; i.e. 
behaviors aimed at causing a change in corporate practices. These are contrasted with other 
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potential retaliatory actions, such as negative word-of-mouth, that are simply aimed at 
damaging the company.  
The existing literature on moral outrage shows that this emotion is important for its role as a 
mediator between the perception of a corporate misbehavior and stakeholders’ decision to 
retaliate. Consequently, any extended model of moral outrage which explores the causes of this 
emotional experience needs to include a behavioral measure. This is necessary to test that, 
rather than independent predictors of intentions to retaliate against the organization, the 
cognitions reviewed are better conceived as drivers of moral outrage; extending a line of 
research that has examined the role of outrage at irresponsible corporate behavior in the past 
(Cronin et al. 2012; Grégoire et al. 2010; Lindenmeier et al. 2012).  
Among the cognitions discussed we expect that only the perceived severity of the violation will 
have a direct influence on negative word-of-mouth. This is consistent with extensive research 
on revenge (Bradfield and Aquino 1999; Grégoire et al. 2010; Tripp et al. 2002). All the other 
causes of moral outrage are not expected to influence the intentions to spread negative 
information against the organization directly. 
A conceptual model of moral outrage at irresponsible corporate behavior 
On the basis of the literature reviewed, we suggest a fairness-based model of moral outrage 
that identifies how cognitive appraisals contribute to determining the emotional experience. 
The model is presented in Figure 1 together with a potential alternative model which is tested 
in this study. The alternative model comprises three additional research hypotheses derived 
from the existing literature on personal anger. The fairness-based model instead interprets 
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existing evidence consistently with the view that sees moral outrage as an emotional reaction 
caused by the transgression of moral principles. 
The fairness-based model hypothesizes that moral outrage is caused primarily by appraisals of 
(un)fairness (H2) and that all other cognitive variables influence the emotional reaction 
indirectly. Namely, it is hypothesized that greed influences fairness (H3) and this variable is in 
turn explained by blame attributions (H4) and the effect of the severity of the outcomes (H6). 
Perceived severity also influences the likelihood of attributing blame to the company (H5). 
Finally both models predict that moral outrage (H1) and perceived severity influence retaliatory 
behaviors against the company (H8).  
The alternative model posits that moral outrage, in addition to assessments of fairness, is also 
the result of direct influences of greed, blame attributions and severity. This model therefore 
contains three more research hypotheses that require empirical testing for two reasons. First, 
the literature on anger reviewed above supports the presence of a direct relationship between 
greed and anger (H9), blame and anger (H10) and severity and anger (H11). Second, existing 
research is unclear on whether anger and moral outrage represent different emotional 
experiences and, in the case of an affirmative answer, what exactly differentiates these two 
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emotions. By testing the two competing research models depicted in Figure 1 it will be possible 
to understand what causes moral outrage in the case of unethical corporate behavior and also 
provide evidence on the conceptual differences between this emotion and feelings of anger. 
Methodology 
We tested the models in two field studies that survey observers’ reactions to real cases of 
irresponsible corporate behavior. The studies allow examining the model in research contexts 
that differ in the level of perceived unfairness of the corporate behavior examined. In the first 
investigation participants expressed their moral judgment on a case of corporate fraud while in 
the second study we focused on participants’ evaluation of a case of tax avoidance. 
Study 1 
We surveyed participants’ evaluations of, and reactions to, a real case of unethical corporate 
practice. The survey asked participants’ opinions in relation to a fraud case involving the global 
pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline (GSK) (Thomas and Schmidt 2012). Consumers 
read an excerpt reporting part of a press release from the US Department of Justice that 
describes GSK’s unlawful promotion of Paxil, an anti-depression medication (Appendix A). 
The use of an excerpt based on an actual court case maximizes the ecological validity of the 
research.  
After reading the excerpt, participants were first asked an open-ended question about their 
immediate thoughts and feelings. Subsequently they completed scales measuring all the 
relevant constructs. Participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk (Buhrmester 
et al. 2011; Paolacci et al. 2010) and completed the survey online. We collected 218 responses. 
Six interviews were not complete, leading to a final sample of 212 participants. 54% of the 
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respondents are female, 44% are university graduates and the average age is 38. All participants 
are resident in the US. Only 22 participants expressed awareness of this case and their 
evaluation did not significantly differ from the rest of the sample (outrage M(aware)= 5.1 versus 
M(unaware)= 5.4; t= .79, p= .43). 
Study 2 
The second study examines consumers’ reactions to a case of tax avoidance. We purposely 
chose to examine a behavior which is not illegal and can be construed as a completely 
legitimate approach to tax planning (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010). At the same time several 
commentators have suggested that tax avoidance is socially irresponsible, especially since it 
contradicts CSR statements promoted by many organizations (Dowling 2013; Sikka 2010). The 
media and political campaigners often condemn this practice (BBC 2012; The Economist 
2013); and there is evidence that many consumers find it questionable (Clark 2013). From the 
perspective of this research, tax avoidance appears to be an interesting issue to examine since 
it might elicit a wider range of views than the scenario analyzed in the first study. 
Specifically, we examined a case of tax sheltering (Hanlon and Heitzman 2010) a practice 
where a company reduces its taxable income through arrangements that can include the use of 
off-shore companies or the exploitation of loopholes in international tax regulations. 
Participants were shown a brief excerpt from a newspaper article outlining the tax avoidance 
strategies of a fictitious company. To ensure the accuracy of the information presented as well 
as the ecological validity of the research, the excerpt was based on publicly available 
information reporting Starbucks’ tax avoidance practices that were scrutinized extensively by 
the media in the UK (Bergin 2012; Neville and Malik 2012). To limit the potential bias caused 
by existing attitudes towards the brand, we decided to use a fictitious brand name1.  
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The scenario was reviewed for content accuracy and clarity by two academics: one researches 
tax avoidance and the other is an expert in consumer behavior. We also conducted a pretest (N 
= 30) where we asked participants what they found unclear about the practices described in the 
excerpt (open-ended question) and collected ratings in terms of clarity (1= clear; 7= unclear) 
and credibility (1= believable; 7= unbelievable) of the scenario. Results indicated that there 
were no concerns with the scenario (Mclarity = 2.07; Mcredibility = 1.90) and consequently we 
included participants from the pretest in our main analysis (for details of the scenario see 
Appendix B). 
Using the same procedures discussed for Study 1, we recruited 382 participants through 
Amazon Mechanical Turk. 47% of the respondents are female, 47% are university graduates 
and 55% of participants are between 25 and 44 years of age2. 
Measures 
After reading the respective scenario describing a case of corporate social irresponsibility, 
participants were asked about their “immediate thoughts and feelings”. Answers to this open-
ended question were reviewed to ensure that no relevant appraisal dimension had been 
excluded from our conceptual model. Subsequently, participants completed the relevant scales 
for our analysis; the same items were used in both investigations. First, participants completed 
measures of moral outrage, captured by three items that, consistent with previous research on 
this emotion (Batson et al. 2009; Lindenmeier et al. 2012), were presented as part of a longer 
scale. Subsequently, consumers answered items assessing the perceived fairness of the 
behavior, the severity of company’s failure, attributions of blame and the perceived greed of 
the company. All measures used are identical to those from previous research on anger 
(Crossley 2009; Grégoire et al. 2010) bar the addition of the relevant company name. Measures 
of negative word-of-mouth are also consistent with previous research (Grégoire and Fisher 
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2006) and were presented at the end of the questionnaire. The exact wording of all items and 
scales is available in Table 2.  
Common method bias 
To limit the potential impact of common-method bias (Podsakoff et al. 2003), all items were 
presented randomly and participants were reminded frequently of the anonymity and 
confidentiality of the study and that all questions had no right or wrong answers. Furthermore, 
all scales we used were concise and clear; and adopted multiple response formats.  
Despite these precautions, since our analysis is based on cross-sectional data, common-method 
bias needs to be quantitatively assessed since it might confound the analysis of the results. We 
adopted the Harman’s single factor test to assess quantitatively common method bias. For 
Study 1 we found that, using a Varimax rotation, a single factor explains 42% of the variance 
(compared with 69% explained by four factors). Since the first factor extracted does not explain 
more than half of the variance we can exclude the existence of a general factor in the data. In 
Study 2, we obtain similar results with the first factor extracted explaining less than half the 
overall variance in the data set (43% compared with 73% explained by three factors). Although 
these results disprove the existence of a general factor in the data, they also show that a sizable 
amount of variance can be explained only by one factor. This is likely due to the fact that the 
variables in our conceptual model are highly correlated (see Table 1) because of theoretical 
reasons, that is strong covariance is expected and should be considered “functional” (see 
Podsakoff and Organ 1986). To further assess common method variance, we run a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis with one single latent construct to evaluate whether a model with 
one general factor shows a reasonable level of fit (see Craighead et al. 2011). Results indicate 
poor fit for the one-factor model both in the case of Study 1 (CFI: .583; TLI: .521; RMSEA: 
.190) and Study 2 (CFI: .705; TLI: .666; RMSEA: .214). These analyses, despite not precluding 
the possibility that common method variance has some effect on our results, suggest that this 
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bias is not a serious concern in this research and, most importantly, does not represent a 
confounding factor in the interpretation of the results. 
Analytical approach 
Following an approach successfully implemented in previous research on consumer anger 
(Grégoire et al. 2010; Joireman et al. 2013), we combine two different approaches to Structural 
Equation Modeling (SEM): PLS-SEM and covariance-based SEM. Scholars suggest that rather 
than alternatives, these two analytical methods can often be considered complementary. The 
main advantages of PLS-SEM are its greater statistical power, ability to handle smaller sample 
sizes and robustness when assumptions of normality are violated (Hair et al. 2011; Hair et al. 
2013). Covariance-based techniques, although they require larger sample sizes, offer more 
accurate assessments of the overall validity of a theory and produce measures of overall fit that 
are particularly useful when evaluating alternative models (Chin 1998; Reinartz et al. 2009).  
In this research we combine these approaches by first comparing the research models presented 
in Figure 1 through PLS-SEM estimation both in the case of Study 1 and Study 2. We use the 
software SmartPLS 2.0 for the analysis (Ringle et al. 2005) and adopt a bootstrapping 
procedure with 5000 re-samples to test the significance of the loadings obtained both for the 
measurement model and for the structural model (Hair et al. 2011). Finally we pool the data 
from the two studies together and estimate a covariance-based SEM using AMOS 21. This 
allows assessing the goodness of fit of both the fairness-based model and the alternative model.  
Results 
As expected, descriptive statistics indicate that the second case of irresponsible corporate 
behavior is perceived in general as less serious than the first one. Across all indicators average 
values are significantly lower in Study 2 (p < .01) and standard deviations higher. This allows 
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exploring whether the expected relationships between variables are observed in these two 
different contexts. We cannot exclude, however, that the differences in values could also be 
partly due to variations in the way the two different stimuli are processed. In Study 2, in fact, 
consumers evaluated a much longer and more complex description of corporate social 
irresponsibility. 
Table 2 and Table 3 present detailed information on the measurement model for both studies. 
Results indicate that the items converge to measure the underlying constructs and present no 
issues in terms of reliability. The loadings for all items measured are above .60 and the 
indicators of reliability all exceed the thresholds suggested in the literature (Hair et al. 2011). 
Despite the very high correlations among some of the constructs in Study 2, the analysis show 
that there are no issues of discriminant validity because all loadings for each indicator are 
higher than its cross-loadings (Hair et al. 2011) and the Fornell-Larcker criterion is respected 
for all latent variables (Fornell and Larcker 1981). 
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Table 3 shows the structural estimates for Study 1 for both the fairness-based model and the 
alternative model. Results suggest that the more parsimonious fairness-based model offers a 
better description of the data. The additional paths that are included in the alternative model 
are not significant statistically.  
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The analysis of the amount of variance explained in the endogenous constructs is presented in 
Figure 2. It further suggests that the fairness-based model offers a better account of moral 
outrage at irresponsible corporate behavior. The additional paths included in the alternative 
model contribute only to a 3% increase in the amount of variance explained. The amount of 
variance explained by the fairness-based model shows a small effect of the cognitions 
investigated on moral outrage and a moderate effect of moral outrage on negative word-of-
mouth (Hair et al. 2011). Overall these results support all hypotheses included in our research 
model except for H9, H10 and H11 that were included in the alternative research model.  
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The estimation of the PLS-SEM structural model for Study 2 is presented in Table 4. Results 
indicate that, in the alternative model, blame and greed do not influence directly feelings of 
moral outrage. On the other hand, severity is a significant predictor of feelings of moral outrage. 
In the fairness-based model all paths are statistically significant in the predicted direction 
except for greed. In terms of overall variance explained (Figure 3), adding the three additional 
links of the alternative model only improve the prediction of the model by 7%. This suggests 
that overall the fairness-based model seems to account better for the data and is more 
parsimonious. This model is able to predict a substantial amount of variance in the intentions 
to spread negative information about the company and a moderate amount of variance in 
feelings of moral outrage. 
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Finally, we evaluated the data from the two studies together and estimated two covariance-
based SEMs. The combined sample of 594 cases, considering the number of parameters 
estimated, is large enough to guarantee a reliable estimation of the research models (Bentler 
and Chou 1987). Figure 4 shows a summary of the results and presents the main fit statistics 
for both models. Although results indicate that both models fit the data reasonably well, the 
fairness-based model appears preferable on at least two grounds. First, of the three additional 
paths considered in the alternative model, two are not statistically significant and one presents 
an unacceptable value since it indicates a negative influence of blame on moral outrage. 
Second, a Δχ2 of 9.31 indicates that the fairness-based model offers a significantly better fit to 
the data (df = 3, p = .025) and it represents a more parsimonious solution. The comparison of 
the two models shows that moral outrage is clearly a different emotion from anger and it is 
primarily influenced by fairness appraisals. 
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Discussion 
This study contributes to research focused on developing a better understanding of how 
stakeholders react to cases of corporate social irresponsibility (Grappi et al. 2013a; Jones et al. 
2009; Murphy and Schlegelmilch 2013; Sweetin et al. 2013). We develop an extended model 
of moral outrage that explains how observers appraise unethical corporate behavior and how 
this appraisal leads to emotional reactions and intentions to retaliate. The study offers several 
contributions to existing research. 
We complement the analysis of the outcomes of moral outrage and moral anger (e.g. 
Lindenmeier et al. 2012; Romani et al. 2013) with a more detailed analysis of the causes of this 
emotional reaction. Understanding the cognitions associated with moral outrage clarifies the 
phenomenology of this emotion (Bagozzi et al. 1999; Roseman et al. 1990) and the drivers of 
stakeholders’ outrage at unethical corporate behavior. Furthermore, this study examines the 
differences between anger and moral outrage, an issue hitherto overlooked in the management 
literature (O’Mara et al. 2011). We present evidence in support of a differentiation between 
these emotional experiences. At least in the context of reactions to unethical corporate 
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behavior, the evidence presented supports that the experience of anger is primarily linked to 
appraisals of unfairness (Thomas and McGarty 2009). From this point of view, results are 
consistent with, but significantly extend, previous accounts of moral outrage that had focused 
on the influence of perceptions of injustice (e.g. Cronin et al. 2012; Lindenmeier et al. 2012). 
In addition to supporting a fairness-based model of moral outrage, our findings indicate which 
cognitions are more likely to lead to perceived unfairness. Blame, greed and perceived severity 
of the violations are all variables that influence significantly the appraisal of fairness. The latter 
appears to be an especially strong determinant of justice attributions and therefore a key driver 
of moral outrage. This finding supports hypotheses that had been previously formulated in 
relation to how stakeholders make attributions of irresponsible corporate behavior (Lange and 
Washburn 2012) and it offers an important insight into what drives people’s emotional 
reactions to negative corporate behavior.  
Managerial implications 
The model presented offers an analytical framework that can help practitioners manage more 
effectively the negative reputational consequences stemming from cases of corporate social 
irresponsibility. The public relations literature, as well as studies of crisis communications, 
highlight the importance of managing the public anger that often follows corporate crises, 
especially when they are caused by moral failures (Carson 2003; Linsley and Slack 2013; Jin 
and Pang 2012).  
The model presented also evaluates the usefulness of different response strategies identified in 
the literature on the basis of their ability to reduce feelings of moral outrage. One potential 
reaction, following a case of irresponsible behavior, is to try to deny culpability or shift blame 
onto others (e.g. suppliers, Government or even employee error) (Coombs 2007). This 
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investigation suggests that focusing on blame diverts attention from the far more important 
battle over fairness. Blame attributions, in fact, do not play a strong role in the experience of 
moral outrage. The evidence suggests that it would be more effective to immediately address 
the perceived severity of the violation either through effective communication or compensation 
(or most likely both - see for example Coombs 2007). Straying from this research, it is 
important to acknowledge that following instances of corporate social irresponsibility, the 
media will play an important role in framing perceptions of fairness as well as potentially 
exaggerate the severity of the consequences (e.g. Van der Meer and Verhoeven 2013). Rather 
than arguing with the media over culpability, our findings suggest that companies focus on 
perceptions of the consequences and redressing the problems caused.  
It is important to stress, however, that the relative weight of the different cognitions is likely to 
vary between specific contexts. In our data we find that greed is a significant driver of moral 
outrage in the first study (corporate fraud) but not in the second (tax avoidance). Practitioners 
should therefore examine the specific circumstances of the crisis they are trying to manage 
before deciding on the best response. 
Areas for further research 
The model presented in this paper does not include all the variables that explain moral outrage. 
Only about half of the variance in feelings of outrage is accounted for. This is reasonable if we 
consider that we only included in the analysis variables relating to the appraisal of a specific 
case of corporate irresponsibility; that is variables associated with the specific situation 
examined. It is expected that several individual psychographic variables would contribute to 
explaining emotional reactions to unethical corporate behavior but these have been omitted by 
the current study because we were primarily interested in focusing on the appraisals of moral 
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outrage. Future studies can examine individual attitudes and beliefs in order to explore how 
these interact with situational appraisals. It is reasonable to expect, for example, that observers’ 
pre-existing attitudes can influence the emotional reactions to cases of corporate social 
irresponsibility. Those who have already a negative view of a certain company (e.g. Cronin et 
al. 2012) or industry or even a negative view of business in general (e.g. Chylinski and Chu 
2010; Skarmeas and Leonidou 2013; Vitell and Muncy 2005) are more likely to react angrily 
towards news of irresponsible corporate behavior that seems to confirm their expectations. 
Furthermore, previous research has documented (Spielberger et al. 1983) that individuals vary 
in their tendency to react angrily to situations that could potentially generate this emotional 
reaction. This is another individual variable that could likely be included in a potential 
extension of the model presented here.  
Other interesting avenues for the development of literature in this area are offered by the 
exploration of a) moderations and boundary conditions that apply to the key processes included 
in the model, b) the analysis of how corporate apologies can be designed to assuage moral 
outrage, c) the examination of other potential outcomes of moral outrage, and d) the analysis 
of how different ways to report cases of questionable corporate behavior can affect 
stakeholder’s reactions. For example, it is possible to hypothesize that observers will appraise 
the corporate transgression differently depending on the nature of the relationship they have 
with the brand responsible. If observers have a strong connection with a brand they might be 
forced to discount information about irresponsible corporate behavior in order to protect self-
esteem (see for example Cheng et al. 2012). This is another area that scholars should pursue in 
the future to further extend our understanding of the causes of moral outrage. This study can 
also inform further research aimed at testing apologies and other response strategies in terms 
of their relative effectiveness in managing outrage and deterring retaliations against the firm. 
Anger and other negative emotions are very important reactions that can lead to damaging 
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behaviors against the organization (Coombs 2007; Jin and Pang 2012). Recently scholars have 
started developing a more systematic analysis of apology and other responses that might follow 
an organizational failure (Coombs et al. 2010; Coombs and Holladay 2001; Kirchhoff et al. 
2012) and this study can contribute to the development of this line of research aiding in the 
identification of the best strategies to minimize moral outrage. In this study we have only 
analysed the impact of moral outrage on negative word-of-mouth. Further research is needed 
to explore other potential outcomes of moral outrage. There is some evidence of the role that 
this emotion plays in boycotts (Braunsberger and Buckler 2011; Cronin et al. 2012; Friedman 
1999). It would be interesting, however, to explore also whether moral outrage can affect 
existing relationships consumers might have with organizations. This would allow 
understanding whether outrage following moral transgressions can cause lasting commercial 
damage to an organization. Finally, in this paper we have examined two different cases of 
corporate social irresponsibility which were presented to participants in different formats. We 
have not explicitly explored, however, how differences in the processing of the stimuli can 
affect the emotional experience. It is reasonable to expect that different styles in the reporting 
of cases of questionable corporate behavior can affect stakeholders’ reactions and this is an 
interesting avenue for future research. 
Conclusion 
Anger at irresponsible corporate behavior is an important driver of consumers’ and other 
stakeholders’ decisions to retaliate against corporations. However, the nature of this moral 
emotion and its causes have not been clarified in previous research. This study presents an 
extended model that explains how different appraisal dimensions influence feelings of moral 
outrage at irresponsible corporate behavior. Broadening our understanding of the causes of this 
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emotional experience is important both for research and practice. Managers might be interested 
in quelling feelings of outrage while campaigners would be likely interested in stirring up our 
emotions to motivate social action. Irrespective of whether one wants to fuel or manage feelings 
of moral anger, understanding the causes of this powerful emotional experience develops 
further our knowledge of the relationships between corporations and society. 
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APPENDIX A 
Global health-care giant GlaxoSmithKline LLC (GSK) agreed to plead guilty and to pay $3 
billion to resolve its criminal liability arising from the company’s unlawful promotion of 
certain prescription drugs and its failure to report certain safety data. The resolution is the 
largest health care fraud settlement in U.S. history and the largest payment ever by a drug 
company. The case related to the sale of many products. One example is reported below.  
 GSK unlawfully promoted a drug called Paxil for the treatment of depression in patients under 
age 18. The drug was never authorized for use in pediatric patients. GSK participated in 
preparing, publishing and distributing a misleading medical journal article that misreported that 
a clinical trial of Paxil demonstrated efficacy in the treatment of depression in patients under 
age 18. The study failed to demonstrate efficacy. GSK sponsored dinner programs, lunch 
programs, spa programs and similar activities to promote the use of Paxil in children and 
adolescents. GSK paid a speaker to talk to an audience of doctors and paid for the meal or spa 
treatment for the doctors who attended. Paxil, like other antidepressants, is a drug that can 
increase the risk of suicidal thinking and behavior in patients under age 18. 
GSK plead guilty to misbranding Paxil and using misleading practices to promote this product. 
Summary of a Department of Justice press release of Monday, July 2, 2012 (full press release 
available at: http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-civ-842.html) 
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APPENDIX B 
How The Breakfast Union Avoid Taxes in the US   
By Jennifer Blake   
The Breakfast Union Corp. is a global coffee company and coffeehouse chain with stores in 
more than sixty countries and thousands of employees. Despite the remarkable success of its 
operations, The Breakfast Union has been recently the target of criticism from several 
magazines and politicians. The accusation made to the company is that, through a number of 
tax avoidance tactics, the firm has managed to ensure that it pays very little tax in the US. This 
is controversial because the US operations have been very successful, with sales of 
approximately $5bn in 2013. Companies, however, do not pay taxes on sales but on their profits 
and this means that The Breakfast Union has managed to pay only around $3m in taxes thanks 
to the implementation of several accounting techniques that artificially lower the profitability 
of the organization. These accounting procedures transfer effectively the profits to jurisdictions 
that have lower taxes.   
The Breakfast Union US decreases its profitability in order to avoid tax in three ways. The first 
one is the payment of royalties for the use of the brand name and other intellectual property 
(mostly related to its business processes and unique store design). The payment is usually 
around 6% of sales and goes to another unit of the same company which is located in a country 
with lower corporation tax than the US. The second technique consists of inter-company loans. 
These loans can be a double benefit to multinationals in terms of saving on tax because the 
borrower will not pay taxes on the interest and the lender can be located in a country that doesn't 
tax earnings from interest. The third way The Breakfast Union US saves on its tax bill is 
through a legal requirement to allocate some of its profits to the accounts of the subsidiaries 
where the product has been processed. For example, The Breakfast Union’s coffee is processed 
both in Switzerland and The Netherlands before being consumed in the US. This means that 
part of the profits generated in the US will be actually transferred to these other countries that 
both have lower corporation tax rates.   
Critics argue that, although these schemes are legal, they are explicitly designed in order to 
avoid tax and therefore are immoral because they allow multinationals to reduce their tax 
burden and give them an unfair advantage over national businesses and individuals. The 
Breakfast Union has replied to the accusations stating that it has done nothing wrong, that the 
company always respects the regulations of the countries where it operates and that it is willing 
to cooperate with the authorities to find solutions to any potential disputes that might emerge. 
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1 It is possible that some consumers might have guessed the real brand involved in the case although the Starbucks’ 
tax avoidance controversy involved mainly the UK division of the corporation. From the analysis of the answers 
to the initial open-ended question we find no evidence that participants guessed the brand (or where interested in 
doing so).  
2 One participant did not complete the demographic questions included in the questionnaire but it is still retained 
in the main analysis. 
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